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We review the explosion of commentary that has followed the release of the Stern 
Review: The Economics of Climate Change, and agree with most of what has been 
written.  The Review is right when it argues on economic grounds for immediate 
intervention to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, but we feel that it is right for the 
wrong reasons.  A persuasive case can be made that climate risks are real and 
increasingly threatening.  If follows that some sort of policy will be required, and the 
least cost approach necessarily involves starting now.  Since policy implemented in 2007 
will not “solve” the climate problem, near term interventions can be designed to begin the 
process by working to avoid locking in high carbon investments and providing adequate 
incentives for carbon sequestration.  We argue that both objectives can be achieved 
without undue economic harm in the near term by pricing carbon at something on the 
order of $15 per ton as long as it is understood that the price will increase persistently and 
predictably at something like the rate of interest; and we express support for a tax 
alternative to the usual cap-and-trade approach.   
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The Stern Review (Stern, et al. (2006) and assorted postscripts) went a long way 
in its attempt to demonstrate how economics has something to say in informing the 
climate policy debate.  Indeed, its release in October of 2006 amounted to a full 
employment act for economists who know something about climate and some who do 
not.  Its release also inspired some scientists and others who don’t know much economics 
to enter the fray, but that is fine, too.  Blogs have been filled with discussions of 
discounting schemes, damage estimates and the like.  The popular press has been littered 
with coverage and commentary, and the academy has broken all records in moving 
“reviews of the Review” through the peer review process and into print.  Four months 
later, the dust is beginning to clear, and so it is appropriate to take stock.  What has the 
Stern Review accomplished in terms of advancing the case for near-term climate policy 
around the world and, perhaps most importantly, in one of the world’s most reluctant 
policy participants – the United States?  That is the point of this paper.     
 
The numerical results reported in the Review are controversial and value-laden, 
but that is the nature of the economic science.  In some instances, the controversy has 
been created by people who want to undermine confidence in the Review’s fundamental 
conclusion - the economics of climate policy tells us unambiguously that it is time to act.  
In other instances, the controversy can be attributed to economists being economists – 
arguing over every point to make sure that this fundamental conclusion is built on solid 
analytical and empirical ground.  In both cases, unusually harsh words have been said 
about the Stern Review.  We have participated in this discussion in large measure because 
we are convinced that the Review provides sufficient evidence to support its fundamental 
conclusion with very high confidence.  We are, though, concerned that this confidence 
may not have been as influential as it could have been because the Review may be right 
for reasons for the wrong reasons.   
 
  Section 1 summarizes briefly what we see as the major messages to be gleaned 
from the underlying documentation of the Stern Review.  A more detailed review of the 
controversial economic estimates follows in Section 2 before a third section offers some 
insight in possible implications for near-term climate policy.  Section 4 focuses attention 
away from “solving the climate problem” and onto how one might design near-term 
policy in light of the long-term evolution of mitigation targets.  Section 5 suggests why 
that near-term design might best be sustained by a carbon tax rather than the more 
popular cap and trade initiatives before a final section offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
1.  The Major Messages. 
 
    The major messages of the Review’s assessment of the current science are sound.  
Indeed, they are largely consistent with the conclusions presented by Working Group 1 in 
its contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
  2Climate Change (IPCC, 2007).  They are consistent, in other words, with the conclusions 
about the underlying science that were unanimously accepted by representatives of the 
signatory nations of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change who 
attended the IPCC plenary meeting in Paris two weeks ago: 
 
a.  Climate is changing faster than was anticipated only 5 years ago in the Third 
Assessment Report of the IPCC (2001); indeed, the signs of human-induced 
climate change are now being observed.   
 
b.  Significant climate impacts have been calibrated in terms of multiple 
metrics, and the thresholds of associated climate risk have been identified in 
terms of changes in global mean temperature; some of these metrics are 
economic, but many of them are not. 
 
c.  Many of the temperature thresholds for critical impacts are, regardless of the 
metric, now thought to be lower than anticipated only 5 years ago; it follows 
that we are approaching them more quickly than we thought, and so we will 
reach them sooner than we thought. 
 
d.  Achieving any concentration threshold cannot guarantee that we will be able 
to keep increases in global mean temperature below any specific target; in 
fact, achieving a concentration target can only reduce the likelihood of 
keeping temperature increases below any target at any point in time in the 
future. 
 
e.  Achieving any concentration threshold may, therefore, only delay inevitable 
increases in temperature unless persistent policy intervention over the entire 
century and perhaps beyond is undertaken. 
 
Figure 2 in the Executive Summary of the Stern Review offers a concise portrait of the 
essential results of the most recent science.  Temperature thresholds for key 
vulnerabilities are identified in many dimensions in the lower portion of the figure; their 
locations, in terms of warming, are the basis for believing that the debate over the science 
of whether or not there is climate risk is over.  To be more precise, while none of these 
thresholds is known with certainty, it is now impossible to argue that all of them are 
completely implausible.   
 
    The imprecise links between temperature targets and concentration targets are 
meanwhile illustrated in the upper portion of Stern’s summary figure when it shows that, 
for example, holding carbon-dioxide equivalent concentrations  
 
a.  below 750 ppm means a greater than 95% chance of exceeding 2 degrees 
(Centigrade) of warming above current levels and a 70% chance of 
exceeding 3 degrees of additional warming, 
 
  3b.  below 650 ppm means a 95% chance of exceeding 2 degrees and a 60% 
chance of exceeding 3 degrees,  
 
c.  below 550 ppm means around a 70%-80% chance of exceeding 2 degrees 
and a 50% chance of exceeding 3 degrees, 
 
d.  below 450 ppm means a 50% chance of exceeding 2 degrees and a 25% 
chance of exceeding 3 degrees, and 
 
e.  below 400 ppm means roughly a 30% chance of exceeding 2 degrees and 
still a 5% chance of exceeding 3 degrees. 
 
While one may quibble about the precise numbers, their order of magnitude is not 
disputed. Putting the two parts of the figure together allows the reader to judge the 
sensitivity of our experiencing any specific risk to changes in policy.  It is, indeed, a 
spectacularly powerful portrait of the predicament within which the current policy debate 
must be conducted. 
 
It follows from its confirmation of the IPCC conclusions that the Stern Review 
makes the case that some sort of policy intervention, based on the economics of applied 
cost-benefit analysis couched in risk management terms, will be required.  It is important 
to note, though, that it is impossible to write climate policy in 2007 that will be valid for 
the entire century.  Coping with thresholds and uncertainty over the long term will 
require adopting an adaptive risk management approach where series of medium-term 
policy decisions will be informed by the evolution of long-term objectives.  Designing 
such a program will be difficult, because it will need to give clear signals of intention 
over the medium-term even as it maintains sufficient flexibility for effective responses to 
changes in scientific understanding, changes in social valuations of impacts, and changes 
in our expectations of how the policies are working.  In every case, however, this 
flexibility must somehow be immune to political and/or economic manipulation, and so 




2.  Controversy about the Economic Estimates. 
 
The Stern Review’s estimates of economic damages and the cost of mitigation 
have been controversial within the economics research community in part because they 
are difficult to understand and in part because they are highly dependent on underlying 
assumptions about discounting, aversion to risk, aversion to inequality, and the valuation 
of non-economic metrics of impact and significant risk (abrupt change and extreme 
events, for example).  Discussions about the estimates are fraught with detailed 
                                                 
1 The Federal Reserve System of the United States is an example of an institution designed to accomplish 
all of these tasks.  While surely in a different context, the Federal Reserve confronts the same sorts of short-
term versus long-term tensions with the same sorts of price or quantity policy tools and protected from 
political manipulation by carefully designed insulation.  
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problem like climate change.  We highlight a few, here, but will shortly argue that the 
case for immediate action survives the controversy, especially if one takes a slightly 
different, but nonetheless economically rigorous tact.  It is important to note in passing, 
however, that much of the controversy might have been avoided if the Review had been 
subject to a proper peer review before its release.  This point was made by William 
Nordhaus at what was, in effect, a day long, public, and ex post peer review hosted by 
Yale University on February 15, 2007.  The Stern author team admitted as much during 
that event, but they expressed concern that pre-publication review would have meant that 
bits of the Review would have been inappropriately leaked to the press.
2      
 
We begin our coverage of the controversy by noting simply that the Stern damage 
estimates are difficult to understand because they are expressed in terms of a “certainty 
equivalent and equity equivalent annuity” metric that converts expected discounted 
welfare values computed across thousands of possible futures and many countries into a 
single number. The analysis underlying the computation of this metric is sound, if not 
brilliant; see Mirrlees and Stern (1972) for the details of its development.
3  Its application 
to the climate problem is path-breaking, but it is vulnerable to the sort of 
misinterpretation that will make people roll their eyes and wonder if any of us know what 
we are talking about.  The authors of the Review are careful to say that “total cost over 
the next two centuries…..are equivalent to an average reduction in global per capita 
consumption of at least 5%, now and forever” (our emphasis).  When the results are 
reported in the popular press, however, the conditional phrase about equivalence is 
usually deleted, and that is a problem.  Readers can react by saying “It’s ‘now’, and I 
don’t see my 5% reduction in consumption.  Where is it?  It’s still ‘now’!  It’s still not 
here!”  
 
Notwithstanding this presentation problem, it is important to note that the damage 
estimates include not only the economic ramifications of climate impacts as they play out 
over time, but also a risk premium tied to the current level of uncertainty about the future 
as displayed in the simulation model.  It is here that aversion to risk and aversion to 
inequality have an effect on the estimates.   Weitzman (2007) argues that the Stern 
estimates undervalue these contributions because the tails of the distributions of our 
understanding of the climate impacts are so “thick”; in other words, the triangular 
representations of uncertainty (with their fixed limits) upon which the underlying 
simulations are conducted do not adequately consider the likelihood of extreme 
consequences.  Yohe (2006) makes the point the risk premia included in the Stern 
estimates assume static distributions of scientific and economic parameters; as a result, 
they miss any potential that new knowledge and/or simple observations might reduce 
uncertainty and thus the willingness to pay over time.  Dasgupta (2006) and Tol and 
                                                 
2 This is a curious assertion. The Stern Review was reviewed by climate and impact experts. Peer review is 
typically done in strict confidentiality. An attempt by one of the current authors to obtain a copy of the 
Stern Review from a referee failed. Instead, he obtained a copy from a journalist, as the Stern Review was 
leaked to the press anyway. 
3 Note that Stern et al. (2006) do not calculate the balanced growth equivalent (as it claims) but rather the 
change in the balanced growth equivalent (Stern et al., 2007). 
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(set at unity) and the assumed aversion to inequality (set at zero).  
 
The damage estimates themselves have been criticized because they are based on 
a very low discount rate – a rate that virtually guaranteed high values.  Dasgupta (2006), 
Maddison (2006), Nordhaus (2006), Tol (2006), Tol and Yohe (2006), Tol and Yohe 
(2007), Varian (2006), Yohe (2006) and Yohe and Tol (2007) all make this point.  Some, 
like Nordhaus, argue that imposing such a low discount rate on investments to mitigate 
climate change in a world where other investments are required to earn higher returns is a 
prescription for the inefficient allocation of resources over time.  Others argue that public 
investments can earn lower than market returns if they complement private investment; 
see for example, Ogura and Yohe (1977).  The discount rate of HM Treasury is indeed 
below market, but above Stern’s.  Still others, including the Stern Review itself, make an 
ethical case for minimizing the rate at which impacts that will be felt by future 
generations are discounted in current policy deliberations.   
 
In any case, as noted by William Nordhaus at the Yale event, it was incumbent on 
the authors of the Review to present the results of a sensitivity analysis spanning a range 
of possible utility discount rates in their primary publication.  Choosing a discount rate 
does, indeed, lie in the purview of decision-makers, and it makes an enormous difference.  
A postscript released with far less fanfare two months after the Review does report the 
results of this sort of analysis, but it received almost no notice – too little, too late.  The 
results are similar to ones reported in Tol and Yohe (2007) on the basis of a simple model 
calibrated to the Stern baseline scenario where damages create the equivalent of a 5.3% 
reduction in per capita consumption.  There, lowering the rate further was shown to have 
very little effect on the estimate while increasing the discount rate to 3% would reduce 
damages to the equivalent of a 1.6% decline in equivalent per capita consumption.  It 
should finally be noted that Weitzman (2007) expresses concern that the economic 
profession at large has not yet solved the problem of exactly how to discount the distant 
future when intergenerational transfers of wealth must be considered.  His point is 
simple: there is a lot of fundamental work still to be done in this regard.      
 
The damage estimates have also been criticized because they seem to have been 
calibrated to the high end of current understanding of impacts, because they sometimes 
miss the opportunity for adaptation especially in a future where incomes are expected to 
be higher, and because they add estimates of catastrophic damages to a baseline that 
already included estimates of the willingness to pay to avoid such calamity.  Tol (2006), 
Tol and Yohe (2006) and Yohe and Tol (2007) have made these points.  Tol and Yohe 
(2007) ultimately confront the “So what?” question by exploring the implications of 
assuming that the developing world’s capacity to adapt will grow over time with their 
economic potential.  To be specific, it is assumed there that developing countries’ 
vulnerabilities to climate risks will have fallen to the current level assumed for the 
developed world by the time their economies have become as productive as today’s 
developed world.  The result is a reduction in discounted damages of more than 50%.  
Why so large for effects that happen so far in the future?  Because the small discount rate 
rewards increases in future adaptive capacity as heavily as it punishes future impacts.      
  6 
Mitigation costs are meanwhile estimated in terms of percentage losses in GDP, 
and so it is difficult to compare the costs of policy with its benefits (calibrated in terms of 
losses in equivalent per capita consumption).  Mendelsohn (2006) has remarked that the 
mitigation cost estimates are too low and that some of the mitigation strategies are, when 
scaled up to the globe, infeasible.  Others have noted that they seem to run only through 
2050, and that they are not corrected for risk and inequality.  Tol and Yohe (2006) 
wonder why the conventional 550 ppm concentration target from earlier UK work  
persists as a policy target when damage estimates are so much higher than before.
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Perhaps most importantly, however, the Review never presents the net effect of mitigation 
in terms of the equivalent per capita consumption metric employed to track damages.  Tol 
and Yohe (2007) have attempted to do so for a simple model calibrated, again, to support 
a 5.3% loss absent any intervention.  They find that achieving a 550 ppm concentration 
target would reduce damages to 2.2%, that a achieving a 650 ppm target would reduce 
damages to 3.0%, and that achieving a 400 ppm target would reduce damages to 0.8%.  
These are not net benefit estimates, of course, because they do not include the cost of 
mitigation.  They do show, however, that no amount of mitigation can be expected to 
eliminate economic harm expressed in terms of per capita consumption equivalents even 
though mitigation does reduce the uncertainty with which we view future impacts.   
 
 
3.  Implications for the Debate about Near-term Climate Policy.    
 
It is essential that members of the policy-making community in the United 
Kingdom, in the United States, and around the world do not to fall into the trap of 
focusing all of their attention on the controversies that surround the specific estimates.  
To do so would mean that they run the risk of missing the most important message of the 
Stern Review.  Decision-makers need to let the economic profession continue to work the 
technical details, but they cannot wait for resolution of the various controversies or 
analytical inadequacies before they begin to work on defining near-term policy in 
recognition of the long-term implications of climate risk identified in Review.  They can 
do so by focusing on the growing proximity of those risks and by understanding the 
efficiency grounds for “buying insurance” against economic consequences of climate 
change and the economic consequences of rapidly ramping-up climate policy in the 
future.  As soon they recognize that some sort of policy will be required (and that 
recognition follows directly from Stern’s summary figure described above), simple 
economics says that taking the least cost approach means starting now. 
 
This conclusion is true in large measure because atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases depend on cumulative emissions over time.  As a result, achieving any 
targeted concentration limit (and thus a corresponding range of possible temperature 
increases and associated climate risks) is fundamentally an exhaustible resource problem.  
                                                 
4 There is another puzzle. The Stern Review has higher damages and lower costs than previous cost-benefit 
analysis in the UK (e.g., Clarkson and Deyes, 2002), yet recommends the same targets for emissions and 
concentrations. When the Cabinet decided that UK climate policy should not be intensified as a result of his 
work, Nick Stern resigned. 
  7The long-standing Hotelling result therefore applies, at least to a first approximation: to 
maximize the discounted value of welfare derived from an exhaustible resource (that is, 
to minimize the discounted costs of limiting cumulative emissions over the long-term), 
simply calculate the appropriate initial “scarcity rent” (in this case, an initial price for 
carbon) and let it increase over time at the rate of interest.
5  To be more specific, the 
Hotelling result means that it is enough to specify an initial price of carbon (or perhaps 
setting targeted permit price for a cap and trade system).  This price should be designed 
to get the attention of the business community and to show political leadership in the face 
of a serious problem.  It need not, however, be set so high that it would cause undue 
economic harm in the short-run.  Allowing the carbon price to increase at the rate of 
interest year after year (following Hotelling) and acknowledging that adjustments for new 
knowledge about performance and risk will have to be accommodated over time will give 
the policy traction.   
 
Adjustments over time in the concentration target (borne of uncertainty about the 
climate system specifically and the future more generally) confound the issue, to be sure, 
but Yohe, et al. (2004) show that some hedging based on the Hotelling result minimizes 
expected costs even if there is a chance that we will discover sometime in the future that 
the climate problem fixes itself and climate policy initiated now was unnecessary.  Why?  
Because the expected costs of adjusting to more pessimistic climate news sometime in 
the future if we delay taking action are higher than the expected costs of doing too much 
too soon (even with discounting at the market rate of interest).   
 
 
4.  Designing a Near-term Policy 
 
Setting the initial scarcity rent for carbon can be an exercise in determining the 
appropriate short-term incentives for carbon-saving investments and energy conservation 
rather than an exercise in “solving the climate problem”.  Since no policy created in 2007 
will “solve the climate problem”, it is perhaps even desirable to step out from under that 
burden to confront a more manageable near-term problem while still making progress 
towards an ultimate response to an evolving understanding of climate risk.  The answer to 
“What to do in the near-term?” is to design something that will (1) discourage long-term 
investments in energy, transportation, and construction that would lock in high carbon 
intensities for decades to come and (2) encourage development of alternative energy 
sources, carbon sequestration technologies and efficiency.   
 
As an example of how the first goal might be achieved, one might consider what 
it would take to make it economic to simply run existing natural gas-fired electric 
generators more, and run coal-fired generators correspondingly less (gas-fired generators 
emit only about half as much CO2 per unit of electricity).  Because natural gas is a 
considerably more expensive fuel than coal, it takes a substantial CO2 cost to overcome 
this fuel cost disadvantage – about $30/ton, on current fuel price expectations in the U.S.  
On the other hand, consider pending investments to add new generating capacity in the 
                                                 
5 Note that the emission reduction trajectory in the Stern Review violates this basic principle; indeed, the 
price of carbon falls over time. 
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conventional coal-fired technology.  What would it take, in terms of CO2 price, to make it 
economic to install new gas-fired capacity instead, thereby cutting by half the carbon 
emissions from this new capacity?  On current gas price expectations, a CO2 price of only 
$5 per ton would be sufficient to make new gas-fired generators as economical as new 
coal-fired plants, based on the present value of fixed and variable costs.  This number is 
much lower for new plants than the $30/ton seen above for existing plants because the 
lower cost of building a new gas plant compensates for some of its higher fuel cost.  
Several factors may necessitate a somewhat higher CO2 price to achieve this economic 
equivalence, however – e.g., greater fuel price volatility makes gas capacity relatively 
less attractive and increased gas demand might push up gas prices beyond current 
expectations.  Even so, only a modest CO2 price is needed to make lower-carbon gas-
fired technologies attractive.   
 
To make the full step to near zero carbon technologies (e.g., carbon capture and 
sequestration) would require a somewhat higher CO2 price – estimated at around $25/ton 
CO2 by several sources and included in Pacala and Socolow (2004) as one possible 
“wedge” of emissions reduction.   But even so, since power generators last 30 to 40 
years, if the CO2 price increases over time, as Hotelling suggests, it can make CCS 
technologies attractive even if it does not reach this “tipping point” until some years after 
the new plant starts operating. 
 
The $7 per ton of carbon dioxide charge envisioned in the legislation being 
considered by the Energy and Natural Resources Committee of the U.S. Senate would, if 
it were to climb at the rate of interest, reach $30 per ton after 2035 – probably too late to 
inspire fuel switching in existing plants over the foreseeable future or much investment in 
carbon sequestration; but it would likely be sufficient to bring most of the plants 
constructed between now and 2050 over to a lower carbon technology.  A $15 per ton 
charge in 2007 would reach the $30 threshold around 2020, though, and that could be 
sufficient to affect the retrofitting switch in most places in the very near future and 
inspire appropriate development of enhanced sequestration techniques. 
 
To shift investments in new infrastructure toward lower or zero carbon 
technologies, then, it is necessary for a climate policy to create a CO2 price.  It must also 
create confidence that within the relatively long planning horizon of such infrastructure, 
the CO2 price will reach and maintain levels that will make the lower carbon technologies 
economic, but those price levels are readily achievable with a realistic policy.  It is 
important to note that the meta-analysis of Tol (2005) suggests that $15 per ton is not an 
unreasonable estimate of the marginal damage costs of current carbon dioxide emissions.  
What would that cost in the economy?  A $15 per ton charge would add almost $6 to a 
barrel of oil.  We have recently seen monthly variation in oil prices bigger than that; the 
difference here is that it would be predictable, and it would affect different fossil fuels 
differently.  It would add 14 cents to a gallon of gasoline.  Given current fuel 
configurations for electricity generation in the United States, it would increase electric 
bills by about 15% of the retail price, on average (and this effect would diminish as lower 
carbon technologies are installed over time).   
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5.  In Support of Taxation as an Alternative to Cap and Trade. 
 
Cap and trade systems have become the stock in trade of many who try to 
advocate climate policy, but this preference may be based on little more than an allergic 
reaction to the use of the word “tax”.  Since concentrations depend on cumulative 
emissions over long periods of time, there is no Weitzman (1974) reason to favor a policy 
that would fix annual emissions in a way that otherwise minimizes the cost of hitting 
such a target.  Yohe (1992) noted, more specifically, that fixing total emissions of any 
pollutant only makes sense if period-to-period variability around a targeted mean (that 
would improve economic efficiency) would unnecessarily increase expected social costs; 
and he argued that this is clearly not the case for carbon emissions.  In addition, Newell, 
et al. (2004), among others, have expressed concerns that the prices which clear cap and 
trade permit markets can be volatile.  Volatility has certainly been the hallmark of the 
sulfur permit markets in the United States and the nascent carbon markets of the 
European Union.  Pizer (2002) responded to threat of incapacitating volatility by 
proposing “safety valve” limits on the price of permits.  Others have argued that volatility 
can be diminished by appropriate banking provisions.  The fundamental problem with 
either solution, however, is that appropriate climate policy requires a clear signal that 
carbon will always be more expensive next year than it is today.  Even a modest amount 
of volatility can obscure that signal.   
 
On other hand, a tax, increasing at the rate of interest a la Hotelling, would 
produce a persistent and predictable increase in the cost of using carbon that would 
inspire cost-reducing innovation and fuel switching in the transportation, building, and 
energy supply sectors of our economy.
6   If carbon were taxed at the point it entered an 
economy (a couple thousand sources for the United States as opposed to millions of end-
users), then it would be dispersed appropriately throughout the economy with relative 
prices of thousands of goods changing in proportion to the underlying carbon intensities.  
Moreover, it would generate revenue.  The $15 per ton of carbon dioxide tax noted above 
would, for example, generate something like $90 billion in tax revenue in the United 
States in 2007 if it were paid on every ton of carbon embodied in every unit of fossil fuel 
consumed.  This is revenue that could be used to offset the regressive nature of the 
carbon tax itself, by underwriting tax credits for citizens with taxable incomes below a 
specified level.  The substitution effect would still apply, of course, so carbon 
conservation could be expected even from the beneficiaries of the credits.  Tax revenue 
could also be used to reduce other distortionary taxes.  It could even be used to fund 
research into alternative energy sources.   
 
A carbon tax would not, of course, provide any incentive to sequester carbon, but 
that can also be accomplished by appropriate use of some of the tax revenue.  Yohe 
(1989) describes how some of the revenue might be used to “buy back” carbon that was 
removed from the end of the effluent stream at a price that equals the tax applied at the 
                                                 
6 The tax should increase, in real terms, at the real rate of interest.  If expressed in nominal terms, then it 
should increase at the nominal rate of interest. 
  10beginning.  Doing so would mean that the marginal cost of bringing in the last ton would 
equal the marginal cost of taking it out – an efficiency criterion that “closes the loop”.  
Interestingly, a $25-30 per ton of carbon dioxide has been identified as the level for 
which current sequestration technologies might become economically efficient.  McCarl 
and Sands (2007), for example, estimate that annual terrestrial offsets alone could total 
between 1 and 1.2 billion tons of carbon dioxide between 2010 and 2035 if a $30 per ton 
value were assigned to carbon dioxide.   Some of the detail behind estimates of this sort 
has been offered by Antle, et al. (2007).  They show carbon sequestration supply curves 
for conservation tillage in the agricultural heartland of the United states that begin at 
carbon dioxide prices that range between $5 and $10 per ton and reach capacity 
thresholds between $30 and $50 per ton.   Bringing these technologies up to scale would 
take more than a decade, of course, and large investment would be based on the same 
type of present value calculation outlined above.  It follows that the same tax trajectory 
that starts at $15 per ton in 2007 and reaches the $30 threshold around 2021 would also 
serve well in this context.        
 
 
6.  Conclusions and Discussion. 
 
We reach the same conclusion as Weitzman (2007); the Stern Review is right for 
the wrong reasons.  The economics of climate policy do support the conclusion that it is 
time to act – not because the underlying science of impacts born of anthropogenic sources 
is not fraught with uncertainty, but because claims that the climate is not changing are 
now indefensible.  Greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced as a hedge against the 
possibility of significant climate impacts and against the risk of expensive policy 
adjustments if nothing is done immediately.  These reductions will best be achieved by a 
price signal that is relatively low today but is guaranteed to rise in a persistent and 
predictable way.  Quite remarkably, we expect that few economists would disagree with 
this conclusion. 
 
The fact that the Stern Review is right for the wrong reason does matter though.  It 
makes the Review an easy target for those want argue against immediate action.  The 
Review can even be used as a weapon by those who want to claim that the climate is not 
changing (or at least that humans are not to blame).  Moreover, its shortcomings have 
forced Stern’s colleagues to publicly defend the integrity and competence of the 
economics profession and the application of economic analysis to the climate problem.   
 
The innovative forms of abuse concocted by some of the smartest economists on 
the planet have entertained some.  Leonardt (2007), for example, began his coverage of 
the public peer review session at Yale (“an academic fight that really matters” in his 
words) with the observation that “The economics profession is engaged in one of those 
(fights) right now and, as luck would have it, it’s even more entertaining than most”.  
That is fine, of course, but the message “Stern is wrong but right nonetheless” must be 
confusing to most – and unnecessarily so. 
 
  11The Stern Review and the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC together seem to 
have silenced the public debate on the reality of the risks of climate change.  We do not 
know which contributed more, but the Stern Review clearly put the economics of climate 
change in the public attention.  On the one hand, this is a good thing.  Economists have a 
technocratic streak, and public scrutiny of their policy advice is absolutely necessary 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994; Funtowicz et al., 1998).  On the other hand, successful 
emission reduction will require a global, century-long effort.  The Stern Review enflamed 
rather than enlightened the discussion from which the effort will emerge.  Where 
consensus is needed, controversy was flamed.  This was true for the immediate aftermath 
of the publication of the Stern Review, and it may still be true.  Let us hope that this is not 
the case for the future.  Let us hope that Leonardt’s (2007) final observation from his day 
at Yale carries the day now that the dust is settling: “In other words, it’s time for a tax on 
carbon emissions”. 
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